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Abstract.  Developing expertise in physics entails learning to use mathematics effectively and efficiently as applied to 
the context of physical situations.  Doing so involves coordinating a variety of concepts and skills including mathemati-
cal processing, computation, blending ancillary information with the math, and reading out physical implications from 
the math and vice versa.  From videotaped observations of intermediate level students solving problems in groups, we 
note that students often “get stuck” using a limited group of skills or reasoning and fail to notice that a different set of 
tools (which they possess and know how to use effectively) could quickly and easily solve their problem.   We refer to a 
student’s perception/judgment of the kind of knowledge that is appropriate to bring to bear in a particular situation as 
epistemological framing.  Although epistemological framing is often unstated (and even unconscious), in group problem 
solving situations students sometimes get into disagreements about how to progress.  During these disagreements, they 
bring forth explicit reasons or warrants in support of their point of view.  For the context of mathematics use in physics 
problem solving, we present a system for classifying physics students’ warrants.  This warrant analysis offers tangible 
evidence of their epistemological framing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Motivation 
Mathematics is the backbone of physics.  It provides a 
language for the concise expression and application of 
physical laws and relations.  A student’s development 
as a physicist entails, in no small part, becoming in-
creasingly comfortable with mathematics.  As physics 
teachers, we share a responsibility to help our students 
develop fluency with the mathematics of physics. But 
what does it mean “to become comfortable with 
mathematics in physics”, how would we recognize it 
happening in a student, and how, as instructors, can we 
facilitate this process?  In this article, we describe how 
we develop a clearer understanding of this issue by 
using videotaped ethnographic observations of groups 
of students solving physics problems in classes rang-
ing from introductory algebra-based physics to gradu-
ate quantum mechanics. 
What we learn is that although mathematics is an es-
sential component of university level science, math in 
science is considerably more complex than the 
straightforward application of rules and calculation 
taught in math classes.  Using math in science criti-
cally involves the blending of ancillary information 
with the math in a way that both changes the way that 
equations are interpreted and provides metacognitive 
support for recovery from errors. Our observations 
lead us to conjecture that expert problem solving in 
physics requires the development of the complex skill 
of mixing different classes of reasoning skills – the 
ability to blend physical, mathematical, and computa-
tional reasons for constructing and believing a result. 
In order to analyze student behavior along this dimen-
sion, we have used the analytical tool of epistemologi-
cal framing.  This refers to the student’s perception or 
judgment (unconscious or conscious) as to what class 
of tools and skills are appropriate to bring to bear in a 
particular context or situation.  Although these fram-
ings are often tacit, in one particular situation they 
become much more explicit: when students argue with 
each other about what to do next.  When there is a dis-
agreement, the discourse tends to include warrants – 
explicit reasons for drawing a conclusion.  We demon-
strate that these warrants fall into clusters, casting a 
light on the way the student has framed the situation 
epistemically.  This leads us to create system of classi-
fying warrants that should provide a useful lens on the 
development of problem solving skills. 
Our observations of students at a variety of levels of 
development of expertise leads us to suggest that, es-
pecially for students who are closer to the novice level, 
epistemological frames can be “sticky”; that is, stu-
dents can get trapped in them for relatively long peri-
ods of time (many minutes). 
These observations suggest that an epistemological 
framing analysis can be potentially useful for instruc-
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tion.  First, it can suggest activities that might facilitate 
the development of expertise; and second, it can per-
mit an instructor to recognize the development of so-
phisticated problem solving behavior even when the 
student makes mathematical errors.1  
B. An example 
Many physics students struggle as they try to develop 
mathematical fluency.  Part of their struggle is un-
doubtedly due to the sheer conceptual complexity of 
the mathematics commonly encountered in physics 
classes.  As a physics major progresses through the 
undergraduate curriculum, she will encounter tech-
niques requiring series expansions, three-dimensional 
vector calculus, linear algebra, complex numbers, dif-
ferential equations, probability theory, and more.  A 
robust understanding of any of these topics involves a 
complicated coordination of a large amount of infor-
mation.  University math departments commonly de-
vote at least a semester-long class to each of the topics 
on that list. 
This paper, however, focuses on a different aspect of 
the mathematical complexity our physics students en-
counter:  epistemic complexity.  “Epistemic” is an 
adjective referring to what one knows about the nature 
of (in this case, mathematical) knowledge.  Simply 
put, the same piece of mathematics commonly fills 
many different roles in a physics class. 
To illustrate epistemic complexity, consider the ex-
pression xf = xi + <v>Δt, relating an initial position xi, 
a final position xf, and average velocity, <v>, and a 
time interval Δt.  First, this expression encodes a cal-
culational scheme.  If the object starts at xi = 3 m and 
maintains an average velocity of <v> = 4 m/s for  
Δt = 2s, then the expression xf = xi + <v>Δt  tells you 
how to combine those given values to produce a nu-
merical result for xf: xf  = 3 m + (4 m/s)(2 s) = 11 m. 
Second, xf = xi + <v>Δt, encodes a physical relation 
among measurements.  An average velocity tells how 
far an object travels per given length of time.  Multi-
plying by the time of the journey gives,  <v>Δt , un-
winding the definition of <v> and representing how far 
you move in a given time interval. Tacking that on to 
where your object started from, xi, must yield the posi-
tion at the end of the journey, xf. 
Third, mathematics provides us with a concise system 
for recalling encoded rules and previously derived 
results.  No one starts all physics problems from first 
principles every time.  One can imagine a physicist 
simply quoting xf = xi + <v>Δt,  and simply thinking 
to himself, “That’s what the final position equation is.” 
Fourth, our sample expression xf = xi + <v>Δt can be 
seen filling yet another role, highlighting another epis-
temic feature of mathematics in physics.  It fits in with 
a large interrelated web of mathematical ideas.  For 
example, it can be derived from the definition of aver-
age velocity by simple algebraic manipulation.  It also 
has the conceptual structure of a base-plus-change 
symbolic form,2 just like vf = vi + <a>Δt, and it coor-
dinates with the interpretation of the determination of 
distance traveled from a velocity graph by the calcula-
tion of the area under the curve.  Stepping even farther 
back, xf = xi + <v>Δt can be seen as a solution of 
 
d 2x
dt2
= k . 
Mathematics thus fills many different epistemic rolls 
for a physicist.  It reflects physical relations, provides 
a calculation framework, forms a web of intercon-
nected ideas, and provides a packaging system for en-
coding rules and previous results.  Even such an ele-
mentary expression as xf = xi + <v>Δt displays this 
epistemic complexity.  Developing expertise in phys-
ics includes learning how to coordinate these various 
natures of mathematics. 
This paper discusses two detailed case studies of upper 
level undergraduate physics students at work on 
homework assignments in their physics classes.  These 
students are grappling with the epistemic complexity 
of the mathematics, often struggling as they juggle 
various interpretations of the math at hand. 
We have two main goals.  First, we propose a cogni-
tive mechanism that helps us model their thinking as 
they juggle these interpretations of their math (episte-
mological framing).  Second, we offer a convenient, 
powerful way to gather evidence of this cognitive 
mechanism from students’ speech (examine the war-
rants students use in their discourse).  We hence turn 
first to overviews of the framing literature and argu-
mentation theory. 
In Sec. II we discuss the cognitive framework we are 
working in including giving an explanation of the con-
cept of framing.  We also give a brief review of the 
relevant elements of argumentation theory.  In Sec. III 
we discuss our methodology.  In Sec. IV we identify 
the four epistemic framings we find in our data, and in 
Sec. V we present our two detailed case studies.  We 
present our conclusions and the implications for in-
struction and future research in Sec. VI. 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
We begin by situating ourselves within a particular 
theoretical way of thinking about student thinking: the 
Resource Framework (RF).  We give a brief summary 
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of the assumptions of this approach. We then provide a 
simple example (“Sarah shifts her reasoning”) to illus-
trate how epistemological framing fits within the RF.  
We then discuss framing in general and epistemologi-
cal framing in particular. 
A. The Resource Framework:   
A brief overview 
There are many theoretical lenses that are available for 
building models of student behavior.  The one we use 
is the Resource Framework (RF) that has evolved out 
of the “Knowledge in Pieces” approach developed by 
diSessa and his collaborators.3 4  This framework is 
documented in detail in a number of published papers5 
6 7 8 and in an evolving Wiki at the Physics Digital 
Library PER-Central website.9  We present a brief 
overview here but encourage readers interested in 
more detail to access the original papers and the web-
site. 
The Resource Framework (RF) is a structure for creat-
ing phenomenological models of high-level thinking.  
It is based on a combination of core results selected 
from educational research phenomenology, cogni-
tive/neuroscience, and behavioral science.  It is a 
framework rather than a theory in that it provides on-
tologies – classes of structural elements and the way 
they behave – and it permits a range of possible struc-
tures and interactions built from these elements.  As 
such, it provides a framework that permits the creation 
of descriptive and phenomenological models that 
bridge many existing models such as the alternative 
conceptions theory and the knowledge in pieces ap-
proach or cognitive modeling with the socio-cultural 
approach. The RF does not (as yet) create mathemati-
cal models in which predictions arise from calcula-
tions. 
The RF is an associative network model with control 
structure and dynamic binding. 
1. Network – The basic ontology of the RF is that of a 
network, built from the well-established metaphor of 
neurons in the brain.  The activation of knowledge is 
thought of as the activation of clusters of linked neu-
rons. 
2. Associative – The activation of one resource or clus-
ter of resources leads to activation of other clusters.  
Learning is pictured at a fundamental level as the es-
tablishment of strong connections so that activation of 
one resource or cluster of resources leads inevitably to 
the activation of other resources.  Associations can be 
excitatory (encouraging activation) or inhibitory (dis-
couraging activation). 
3. Control structure – The network of resources in the 
brain is not simply associative.  There brain has struc-
tures (hippocampus, cingulate gyrus, etc., etc.) that 
appear to have specific purposes, just as in other parts 
of the body (heart, lungs, liver, etc., etc.).  A major 
structure that has particular relevance for us is the pre-
frontal cortex, which is where perceptual information 
is mixed with information in long-term memory to 
prime appropriate responses and actions. The evalua-
tion of a perceived situation affecting action is a very 
well documented component of behavior in mammals 
in situations ranging from simple conditioning of rats 
to complex social behavior in humans.  (See for exam-
ple Fig. 1 and the extensive references in Redish, Jen-
sen, and Johnson.)10  Control structures rely heavily 
not only on activating association, but also on inhibi-
tion. 
4. Binding – Clusters of resources that activate to-
gether frequently become strongly tied so that they 
always activate together.11  This makes possible the 
creation of networks of higher level structures – con-
cepts, p-prims, or schemas – that the user perceives as 
unitary.  Binding can occur at many levels from being 
extremely tight (e.g., it is hard to see the word “cat” 
and not to imagine its referent) to being rather loose 
(e.g., one can perceive an orchestral performance as 
unitary or listen for individual instruments or motifs).  
Both basic associations (concepts) and control struc-
tures (framings) can be tightly or loosely bound. 
5. Dynamic – A critical element of the entire model is 
that it is extremely dynamic.  Associations are acti-
vated and inhibited depending on context. 
In this paper we are building a component of the con-
trol structure appropriate for using mathematics in 
physics: epistemological framing. 
B. A framing story:   
Sarah shifts her reasoning 
An analysis in terms of epistemological framing fo-
cuses on the moment-to-moment shifts observed in 
students’ reasoning.  Their interpretation of the task 
and knowledge at hand can change, as in the following 
example.12  “Sarah” is an upper-division undergradu-
ate physics major who sat for an interview aimed at 
her understanding of electrical conductors and insula-
tors. Sarah has just explained how insulators are so 
dense that current cannot flow through them. Wanting 
to explore this further, the interviewer brings up the 
case of Styrofoam. When the interviewer asks her 
whether Styrofoam is an insulator, Sarah responds that 
it is. Her response to the interviewer’s question, 
“Why?” is that she “memorized it”. The conversation 
continues, and when the next opportunity arises for 
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Sarah to justify a claim she makes a blanket statement 
citing “organic chemistry”. So far in the interview, she 
is relying on authority in her explanations, quoting 
rules and facts. 
After the interviewer prods her to give “any explana-
tion you find,” Sarah’s reasoning undergoes a shift. 
She gives a more detailed, more conceptual account of 
conductance. Sarah puts together a little story about 
electrons getting torn away from their parent atoms 
and then being free to move. She explains how a bat-
tery could perhaps cause this electron-tearing and how 
a higher temperature wire might also have more en-
ergy available to tear electrons off the atoms. 
The shift we care about in Sarah’s reasoning concerns 
the types of explanations she gives. She began by 
quoting facts. Implicit was Sarah’s epistemic interpre-
tation of her situation and the interviewer’s intentions. 
What is the nature of the knowledge in play here?  
“Oh, OK, this interviewer wants factual information 
about conductors and insulators. I’ll give him some 
facts I remember.” 
The interviewer’s apparent dissatisfaction with her 
quoted facts and subsequent “any explanation you 
find” prompt caused Sarah to reinterpret the activity. 
She came to see the interviewer’s questions as prompts 
to tell a story about conduction. Sarah is less sure of 
her story about tearing off electrons than she was 
about her quoted facts, but she sees this uncertainty as 
permissible now. Epistemically, “now we’re construct-
ing stories, not quoting facts.” 
Briefly, Sarah has a different epistemological framing 
of her activity in the two parts of this episode. The 
different epistemological framings, different implicit 
answers to “What kind of knowledge is in play here?” 
led Sarah to bring different subsets of her knowledge 
store to bear on the interviewer’s questions. 
We now turn to a more detailed account of this epis-
temological framing process, beginning with an over-
view of epistemic resources. 
C. Epistemological resources activate and 
deactivate in Sarah's reasoning 
In our brief example Sarah treats knowledge as two 
different types of things.  She begins by viewing 
knowledge as fact-based and authority-driven, later 
shifting to seeing knowledge as a personally con-
structed thing.  We describe this shift by saying that 
different epistemological resources have been cued in 
Sarah’s mind. 
An epistemological resource is a cognitive modeling 
element.  It represents a tightly bundled packet of in-
formation that, when activated by the mind, leads the 
individual to interpret the knowledge at hand in a cer-
tain light.  But an epistemological resource is a control 
structure, not a concept; epistemological resources 
affect how students perceive the nature of the situation 
under current consideration and they control what con-
ceptual resources are brought to bear.  Do they see 
scientific knowledge as fixed and absolute or as being 
relative to one’s point of view?  Do they view scien-
tific knowledge as something they can construct for 
themselves or as something that must be handed down 
from an authority figure?13 14 
Epistemological resources, like other resources, are 
dynamic; they can activate and deactivate during the 
moment-to-moment flow of an episode.  Broad, decon-
textualized questions such as “Do you see science 
knowledge as being handed down from authority?” at 
least by themselves, are unlikely to elicit meaningful 
information on students’ functional epistemologies. 
Such a question assumes that students have relatively 
stable, context-independent beliefs about the nature of 
science. Much like the case with conceptual knowl-
edge, 3  6  authors have argued that students’ epistemic 
stances are manifold and highly sensitive to context.15 
16  Sarah, for example, displayed a shift from “knowl-
edge as authority driven” to “knowledge as con-
structed by oneself” in her brief electric conduction 
interview. This shift happened in response to an inter-
viewer’s prod. It was an in-the-moment reaction to the 
natural flow of the conversation. One would certainly 
not expect that this isolated shift signals a large-scale 
change in Sarah’s approach towards physics. It is un-
reasonable to think she never saw physics as being 
about telling conceptual stories before, nor is it rea-
sonable to think she will never quote authority again. 
There are many similar published examples of in-the-
moment shifts in students’ reasoning.6 7 17 18 
As further evidence of the manifold nature of students’ 
epistemologies, there also tends to be a disconnect 
between how students view the nature of formal sci-
ence and how they proceed to interpret their own work 
in science class.19  Epistemological stances evolve, in a 
time averaged sense, in complex ways as a student 
progresses through his education.20 
On more local timescales, many epistemological re-
sources are available to students.  These epistemologi-
cal resources are often closely correlated with certain 
bits of the wide range of conceptual information avail-
able to students.  Sarah’s activation of “knowledge as 
authority-driven” pointed her towards her store of or-
ganic chemistry facts (or perhaps vice-versa). 
With a wide range of conceptual and epistemological 
possibilities available, a model of students’ thinking 
must also include a process by which the set of all 
possible epistemological and conceptual options is 
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pared down to a manageable size for conscious con-
sideration by the individual.  That process is called 
framing.  This paper proposes a specific epistemic lens 
(looking at the warrants used in their arguments) for 
analyzing how upper level physics students are fram-
ing their use of mathematics. 
D. Framing:   
What kind of activity is going on here? 
So far, we have been using the term “framing” in what 
amounts to a “common speech” mode.  We have not 
defined it explicitly.  But in the behavioral sciences, 
especially anthropology and sociolinguistics, “fram-
ing” represents a specific technical term.  Framing is 
the, usually subconscious, choice the mind makes an-
swering the question, “What kind of activity is going 
on here?”  It narrows down the set of all possible men-
tal options to a manageable subset. An individual’s 
framing of a situation tells them what is necessary to 
pay careful attention to in a situation and what can be 
considered irrelevant and ignored.  This “selective 
attention” reduces processing load and is the benefit 
created by the mental structure that permits framing.21  
Framing is a common, everyday cognitive process. 
As a quick example, consider entering a hotel. Even if 
you have never been in that particular hotel before, 
you will immediately have a general idea how to pro-
ceed. You would expect there to be a front desk with a 
check-in clerk, lots of numbered rooms organized in a 
particular way, and perhaps a restaurant or two.  You 
would plan on doing certain things in this building like 
sleeping and preparing for the next day’s business. 
You would also have social expectations. You would 
not plan on shouting across the lobby, playing your 
television at full volume at 11pm, or throwing furni-
ture off the balcony. 
Framing should not be equated to activating a large, 
stable instruction list. It’s not as if you immediately 
run down a checklist upon entering a hotel. Where’s 
the elevator? There it is. Where is the concierge desk?  
There it is. Where is the restaurant? There it is. Large 
data structures like this hotel list are like a set empty 
slots ready to be filled in with the particulars of a 
situation. Several early studies in artificial intelligence 
(from which modern framing studies partially evolved) 
were concerned with identifying (and then program-
ming) such data structure “frames”.22 23 24  
This paper does not equate framing with the recall and 
activation of organized, rigid data structures. Rather, 
we see framing as the cuing of fuzzy, adaptable net-
works of cognitive resources.  Not finding a restaurant 
in your hotel doesn’t necessarily destroy your interpre-
tation of your surroundings as a hotel.  If the room 
numbers’ organization isn’t the standard floor-by-floor 
numeric order, you would likely still be able to find 
your room eventually. 
Framing has been studied in a wide array of academic 
disciplines including linguistics, sociology, art, psy-
chology, and anthropology.25 26 27 28  All of these stud-
ies implicitly agree on the existence of what has been 
called “Felicity’s Condition”.29  Felicity’s Condition is 
the unspoken premise naturally adopted by an individ-
ual that incoming information, whether it be spoken, 
read, observed, etc, comes from a rational source, and 
it is thus up to the individual to attempt to contextual-
ize and hence interpret that incoming information. 
Framing is the process by which the mind attempts this 
contextualization and interpretation. 
Different individuals can certainly frame the same 
incoming information in different ways.27  A quick 
example is to note that what may be play to a golfer is 
work to the caddy.30  Miscommunications can arise 
when two individuals frame their interaction differ-
ently, each bringing a different subset of their avail-
able resources to bear on the situation. Framing should 
not be thought of as something that happens only once 
at the start of a new activity. People continually re-
check their framing of a situation and may alter it ac-
cordingly, bringing new resources into conscious con-
sideration while temporarily disregarding other ones.31  
Sarah and her discussion of electrical insulators is one 
such example. 
Framing can lead people to subconsciously disregard 
some strands of input information that are not seen as 
currently relevant. A latecomer taking his seat at a 
theater can be ignored, possibly not even noticed, by 
other audience members.26  The students in this pa-
per’s later case studies display an analogous selective 
attention.  They can seem temporarily oblivious to a 
mathematical course of action that may be obvious to a 
classmate, instructor, or researcher.  This selective 
attention is a direct result of their epistemological 
framing of their mathematics.  They, in that moment, 
are interpreting the math at hand in a certain way, fo-
cusing on a particular aspect of the math knowledge in 
play. 
E. Argumentation theory helps us  
get evidence of framing 
Framing is often unconscious, even unnoticed by the 
person doing it.  How, then, can a researcher gather 
evidence of how these upper level physics students are 
framing their use of mathematics?  How can we iden-
tify what they see as “the particular nature of the math 
knowledge in play”?  A possible solution was sug-
gested in our observations of students working on 
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physics problems in groups.  When students disagree 
on a procedure or result, they are often explicit about 
why something should be believed or not.  These 
comments, referred to as warrants in argumentation 
theory, show us what epistemic assumptions they are 
making at the moment.  We therefore suggest: look at 
the warrants they use in their math arguments.  We 
hence turn to a brief overview of argumentation the-
ory. 
There are several subfields that are sometimes collo-
quially lumped under the rubric, “argumentation the-
ory”.32  On one end of the continuum is what is best 
called formal logic. Studies in formal logic deal with 
relatively clean and straightforward methods of proof-
making that can easily be decontextualized from what-
ever given situation is at hand. The formal logic chains 
that result from such analysis, chains like “If A then B, 
if B then C but not D, etc,” lend themselves readily to 
computational modeling,33 although even such appar-
ently straightforward applications of classical logic 
rely on fuzzy mental processes that are very difficult to 
describe in detail analytically.34 
A second branch of research, the one that is most often 
actually called “argumentation theory”, includes what 
is often called rhetoric.32  This field of research fo-
cuses most on presenting, as opposed to having, an 
argument. It attempts to parse the content of a given 
argument into some kind of structure and often carries 
some sort of evaluative tone with regard to that struc-
ture. A central pillar of this field, and an important 
basis for this paper’s analysis, is the work of Stephen 
Toulmin. He devised an often-cited system for parsing 
an argument into such parts as claims, data, and war-
rants.35  A person will make a statement, the claim, 
that requires proof. They will then offer one or more 
relevant facts, the data. The warrant is the bridge, 
sometimes unspoken, that explains how the given data 
relates to the claim at hand. For example, I might state 
that Thomas Jefferson is the greatest American found-
ing father (claim) because he largely wrote the Decla-
ration of Independence (data). The relevant warrant 
that would link this data to that claim would be that the 
Declaration of Independence is a cornerstone docu-
ment of the United States, laying out the nascent coun-
try’s case for autonomy. 
Because argumentation theory deals more with real-
world arguments than formal logic, analysis schemes 
like Toulmin structures are best thought of as heuristic 
guides for parsing arguments, not formal organizers. 
Attempts to carefully map out even the structure of a 
published, formal legal argument according to Toul-
min’s scheme resulted in an explosion of complexity.36  
Researchers found it increasingly necessary to add 
sublevel after sublevel to the basic claim-data-warrant 
scheme as they encountered more and more inter-
woven lines of reasoning. Even with all these compli-
cated sublevels in the argument’s diagram, they had 
trouble accounting for large chunks of implicit infor-
mation that the writers of the legal document simply 
assumed the reader would know (cf. Ref 34).  Another 
study trained a group of corporate professionals in 
Toulmin structures and then had them try to apply this 
tool to diagram an argument relevant to their profes-
sion. Their success was limited, and many participants 
noted that the resulting argument diagrams were less 
convincing than the original arguments.37  
We see these arguments as pushing a Toulmin analysis 
too far; somewhat analogous to Hilbert’s or Russell 
and Whitehead’s attempt to create a complete axio-
matic structure for mathematics.  It is now known that 
such a complete structure is impossible even for 
mathematics, and the interaction of a student with a 
physics problem is not in fact formal mathematics. It is 
more closely akin to natural discourse. 
Naturally occurring arguments are more nebulous than 
an argument fitting a clean Toulmin structure. Justifi-
cations that may be logically unsound can be cogni-
tively sound – completely acceptable and compelling 
in informal, real-time situations according to compli-
cated, probabilistic mental processes.38  A branch of 
research, often gathered under the label “discourse 
analysis”,32 concerns itself primarily with the in-the-
moment patterns people employ in their speech and 
thought as they construct and communicate arguments. 
These in-the-moment argument constructions are often 
verbally incomplete. They often refer to a body of 
knowledge that the speaker (correctly or incorrectly) 
assumes he shares with the listener. These flow-of-
conversation arguments sometimes have holes in them 
that are consciously or unconsciously overlooked. 
This paper’s work will most closely align with this 
discourse analysis research approach. It takes a de-
tailed look at physics students’ mathematical argu-
ments, but it does not attempt to analyze these argu-
ments according to a formal, computational structure 
of logic. As later examples demonstrate, these stu-
dents’ thinking is too dynamic to allow such a struc-
tural interpretation. This paper merely borrows Toul-
min’s idea of a “warrant” to help analyze a vitally im-
portant “in-the-moment pattern” in physics students’ 
speech and thought:  their epistemological framing of 
the math at hand.  Students’ warrants can shift from 
moment to moment, and these shifts are closely tied to 
what they interpret as the nature of the math knowl-
edge currently in play. 
Practically speaking, this shifting of warrants results in 
physics students giving different kinds of proof at dif-
ferent times during a mathematical argument. The 
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analysis of the students’ mathematical warrants offers 
a powerful window to describing how they are cur-
rently framing their activity. 
The idea of different kinds of proof being accepted in 
an argument is not, in general, a new one. On a 
grander scale, researchers have noted that what counts 
as valid proof does not necessarily remain the same as 
one crosses social or cultural boundaries. One needs 
look no further than the Creationist/Evolution debate 
for an example.39  On a smaller classroom scale, this 
phenomenon of shifting justification has also been 
noted with biology students.40  
The idea of different kinds of reasoning counting as 
sufficient proof has also been noted in mathematics 
education research. Researchers have discussed, for 
example, the embodied, proceptual, and formal rea-
sons 13 + 24 equals 24 + 13.41 42  The embodied ex-
planation is that adding twenty-four objects to a col-
lection of thirteen objects gives you the same total 
number as if you started with thirteen objects and 
added twenty-four. A proceptual explanation focuses 
on how you can manipulate the meaning-laden sym-
bols in the problem in a prescribed manner, i.e. you 
can do the column-addition you learned in elementary 
school, and get the same result either way. The formal 
reason 13 + 24 equals 24 + 13 is that it’s assumed true 
by axiom. It’s the commutative property. 
Two extended case studies demonstrate how the flow 
of a physics problem solving conversation can be 
parsed by viewing it as two or more individuals trying 
to juggle and coordinate various types of mathematical 
justifications – epistemological framings – in their 
reasoning. 
F.  A summary note on terminology 
In summary, we use three terms to describe our epis-
temological control structure: epistemological framing, 
epistemological resources, and warrants.  Note that by 
introducing these distinct terms, we are not proposing 
that these correspond to three distinct cognitive struc-
tures.  Although that may be the case, we do not at this 
time have evidence to support that claim.  Rather, we 
use these three terms to provide a way of emphasizing 
different aspects of what may, in the end, turn out to 
be a reasonably unitary and non-separable process: the 
process of making a judgment about what knowledge 
applies in a particular situation. 
The use of the term framing focuses our attention on 
the interaction between the cue and the response.  It 
stresses that there is an evaluation based on previous 
general knowledge and experience that is taking place.  
This evaluation is very often a subconscious one.  This 
paper’s explicit focus on the warrants observed in 
physics students’ mathematical arguments is precisely 
an attempt to define explicit evidence for the inher-
ently implicit cognitive process of framing. 
The use of the term resource focuses our attention on 
the fact that the kinds of reasons students cite fall into 
broad categories with a common underlying structure. 
 The use of the term warrant focuses our attention on 
the epistemic nature of the specific argument being 
made.  For example, a student pointing to a five-line 
calculation he just performed and a student pointing to 
an electronic calculator’s output may be using slightly 
different specific warrants (i.e. you can trust a careful 
manual computation vs. you can trust a machine’s 
algorithmic churning).  Both students’ reasoning, 
however, falls under the same general class of warrant:  
algorithmically following a set of established compu-
tational steps should lead to a trustable result.  We 
would call this general class of warrant an epistemic 
resource.  It’s a general, repeatedly observable way 
students view knowledge.  This epistemic resource 
acts as a cognitive control structure.  It is one (of 
many) regulators of students’ epistemic framing (i.e. 
how they implicitly choose to interpret the knowledge 
at hand). 
In the case studies that follow, we are somewhat loose 
with our specific uses of “class of warrant” vs. speak-
ing of one particular flavor of warrant specific to the 
situation at hand.  There is simply not always suffi-
cient evidence to carefully distinguish between the 
two, nor is it vital to our general argument (that focus-
ing on warrants gives explicit evidence of epistemic 
framing) to do so. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Before turning to our two extended case studies, we 
give a brief description of the video data used in this 
study and how our common framings emerged from 
this data set. 
Approximately 150 hours of raw video data of upper-
level undergraduate physics students was collected for 
this study.  These students were enrolled in such 
classes as Quantum Mechanics I and II, Intermediate 
Mechanics, Intermediate Electricity and Magnetism, 
and Intermediate Theoretical Methods.  Most were 
physics majors.  None were in their first university 
physics class. 
About 80 of these 150 hours (including both this pa-
per’s case studies) come from group homework ses-
sions.  Our students would routinely meet outside of 
class to work on their homework together.  We simply 
would ask their permission at the start of the semester 
to video tape these meetings.  Another 25 hours of the 
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video data set came from individual problem-solving 
interviews with students.  The rest of the video set was 
made of actual classroom recordings.  These class-
room videos tended to be less useful for this study 
since they contained a much smaller amount of student 
speech. 
A. Students' framings are easiest to iden-
tify via contrasts and shifts 
Evidence for how students are framing their math use 
is easiest to pick out when there is some sort of con-
trast or misunderstanding present. Such framing con-
fusions are common sources of disagreements, even in 
non-physics settings.43  Many mathematical disagree-
ments physics students have with each other reduce to 
the first student essentially saying “Look at this math 
issue this way” while the second student is claiming 
“No, you should be looking at it this other way”.  The 
students are debating which aspects of their mathe-
matical knowledge are currently relevant. Examining 
the warrants35 physics students use in their mathemati-
cal arguments offers a good window to how they are 
currently framing their math use 
B. Data selection process 
We needed some sort of selection process that could 
pare down our 150-hour data set to a collection appro-
priate for a close, careful analysis.  The first author 
was present during 95% of the tapings themselves and 
took detailed notes of the students’ activity. These 
notes allowed the video databank to be quickly 
searched for the best debates, arguments, and misun-
derstandings. At this early point in the pare-down 
process, “best” simply meant the debates and argu-
ments that most likely had a lot of material available 
for possible analysis. Sometimes “best” translated to a 
simple clock reading. If students spent five minutes 
arguing about a certain point, there was a good chance 
a closer analysis might find a relatively large amount 
of speech that clearly annunciates their ideas. Other 
times the “best” arguments were selected for the nov-
elty of their content. An argument about whether an 
expression simplifies to x2 + 2x + 1 or to x2 - 2x + 1   is 
likely to be routine. The students are likely to quickly 
agree on a useful way to resolve the argument. They 
are likely to share a common framing, which means 
there won’t be much explicit evidence for that fram-
ing. However, an argument about a novel issue is 
much more likely to bring about a variety of ap-
proaches, a variety of framings. 
The first pass through the 150-hour data set yielded 
about 50 snippets containing the arguments, debates, 
and misunderstandings most likely to be explicit and 
long enough to offer good evidence (i.e., clearly iden-
tifiable mathematical warrants) for how the students 
were framing their math use. Eventually, a framing 
analysis was carried out on other episodes that didn’t 
contain such obvious arguments. Such an extension 
helped to assure the generality of our framing analysis. 
The reader is invited to look at the dissertation from 
which this paper is drawn for such non-argument ex-
amples.1b 
Our 50-snippet subset of arguments was meant to offer 
the best evidence for deciding whether a set of com-
mon framings exist and, if they do, what they specifi-
cally are. The next section describes the methodology 
used  to help these common framings emerge. 
C. Knowledge analysis:  Common fram-
ings emerge from the data set 
In order to make sense of our data, we performed a 
knowledge analysis.2 44  The basic idea is to find a 
common thread to condense the episodes according to 
a common analysis scheme. Knowledge analysis is an 
iterative methodology. 
Specifically, this project began with identifying a 
small sample of about 50 episodes that were most 
likely to contain relatively easy-to-spot frame shifts. A 
subset of these 50 sample episodes were analyzed in-
dividually at first, the goal being to describe what type 
of warrants were the students were using in their 
mathematical arguments. 
Once a small collection of these individual analyses 
were collected, it became possible to look for consis-
tencies across episodes.  Several clusters incorporating 
similar individual math framing examples were identi-
fied. The next step was to do a similar analysis on a 
new set drawn from those 50 episodes and see if these 
original clusters could incorporate these new examples 
of students’ mathematical thinking as well. Appropri-
ate changes were made to the clusterings in light of 
this new data set, and then a third set of episodes were 
considered. After several iterations, the clustering 
scheme stopped evolving significantly. Eventually the 
whole 50 episode subset was used, with each individ-
ual episode cycled through more than once. 
Four main clusters emerged from this data set’s exam-
ples of physics students’ framing of their math use. 
They capture four general types of justification these 
students offer for their mathematics: “Calculation”, 
“Physical Mapping”, “Invoking Authority”, and “Math 
Consistency”.  These clusterings are not meant to be 
mutually exclusive or sufficient to span all possibili-
ties. They are merely presented as the most convenient 
way found of structuring comparisons across many 
different episodes in our data set. 
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IV. THE FRAMING CLUSTERS THAT 
EMERGED FROM OUR DATA SET 
Our knowledge analysis led us to classify the student 
interactions into four common framing clusters:  Cal-
culation, Physical Mapping, Invoking Authority, and 
Math Consistency.  These framings parallel the discus-
sion of xf = xi +<v> Δt  in the introduction. We begin 
with a brief overview of each and then present a more 
complete discussion and comparison of the four clus-
ters.  Finally, we discuss inter-rater reliability. 
A. Framing 1:  Calculation 
A calculation framing, like all the other framings that 
emerged from the data set, is primarily identified by 
the general class of warrant students choose to use.  In 
this case the epistemological resource (i.e. the general 
class of warrant observed) is:  algorithmically follow-
ing a set of established computational steps should 
lead to a trustable result.  The specific warrants used, 
like all the other warrants we identified in our data set, 
couples closely to the epistemological resources cur-
rently activated by the student.  Epistemological re-
sources, recall, are control structures.  They lead the 
student to frame the knowledge at hand in a certain 
way, which focuses the student’s attention on a par-
ticular subset of his total knowledge. 
In a calculation framing, students rely on computa-
tional correctness.  The warrant may be implicit, espe-
cially in non-argumentative settings. If an instructor 
were deriving yf = yi +vit – ½gt2   from , she 
would probably just carefully explain her steps to her 
students. They would likely accept the result without 
further thought.  It is rare to explicitly explain, “OK, 
because carefully following a set of computational 
steps allows one to trust a result, we should trust this 
derivation.” It would rely on an unspoken epistemo-
logical resource, one that’s shared because both in-
structor and student frame the discussion as calcula-
tion. 
B. Framing 2:  Physical mapping 
When physics students frame their math use as physi-
cal mapping, they support their arguments by pointing 
to the quality of fit between their mathematics and 
their intuition about the physical or geometrical situa-
tion at hand. This class of warrant can be associated 
with the epistemological resource: a mathematical 
symbolic representation faithfully characterizes some 
feature of the physical or geometric system it is in-
tended to represent.  Again, it is through identifying 
these (relatively explicit) warrants that a researcher 
can get information about the (relatively implicit) epis-
temological framing process in the student’s mind.   
For example, suppose we wanted to explain why the 
expression for the force exerted by a spring, F = -kx, 
includes a negative. We might explain how stretching 
a spring makes it pull backwards as it tries to contract 
back to its natural length. If you compress the spring, 
it’ll push back against the compression as it tries to 
expand. In both cases the spring force is opposite the 
way the spring is deformed. That is, if kx is positive 
(say you extend the spring to the right) then the spring 
pulls in the negative (i.e. left) direction.  If kx is nega-
tive (say you compress the spring leftwards) the spring 
exerts a force to the right (positive) direction. Again, 
we do not necessarily have to spell out an explicit war-
rant or our math-should-model-the-world epistemo-
logical resource. They come along with a physical 
mapping framing. 
There is a more general point about distinguishing a 
calculation framing from a physical mapping framing. 
At some level, all mathematics is ultimately grounded 
in physical experience. A child learns to associate “1” 
with a single object, “2” with a collection of two ob-
jects, and so on. Higher and higher mathematics are 
built up by analogy and extension of what are ulti-
mately physically grounded ideas.45 46  The distinction 
between a calculation framing and a physical mapping 
framing largely concerns a person’s in-the-moment 
awareness of the physical referents of her math. 
We note that for this work, we do not distinguish be-
tween the use of physical statements from the use of 
abstract geometrical statements as warrants.  This is 
because in the examples we observed, the geometry 
arose out of the location of the physical situation in 3-
space.  We expect that if a wider class of situations 
were considered, it might be appropriate to separate 
physical and geometrical framings. 
C. Framing 3:  Invoking authority 
Suppose we were trying to convince you what the rota-
tional inertia of a solid sphere was. We might simply 
pick up an introductory physics book, thumb through 
the index until we found “rotational inertia”, turn to 
page 253, and point at an entry in a table that says 
“solid sphere, 
 
I = 2
5
MR2 ”.  Perhaps you would accept 
our argument, also accepting the implicit class of war-
rants (i.e. epistemological resource) that underlies our 
reasoning: information that comes from an authorita-
tive source can be trusted. 
An invoking authority framing is often closely tied to 
finding the right level of detail to go into during a 
problem. It is unreasonable to take every single prob-
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lem down to absolute first principles every time. Some 
results will always simply be taken for granted. Per-
haps you would be more likely to accept our earlier 
argument for the rotational inertia of a solid sphere if 
we were engaged with a larger problem like finding 
the time it would take such a sphere to roll down a 
given ramp. You might judge the specific value of the 
sphere’s rotational inertia to be sufficiently irrelevant 
to the problem’s main purpose to permit us to quote 
from the textbook. 
Another common trait of the invoking authority fram-
ing is the absence of extended chains of mathematical 
reasoning. “Chaining” has been closely tied to stu-
dents’ mechanistic reasoning.47 48  When a student 
links together a series of implications, she is chaining. 
An example would be “adding another resistor in se-
ries puts another obstacle in the current’s way, so the 
total resistance goes up, but the battery’s push remains 
the same, so the current flowing decreases”. Students 
engage in mathematical chaining arguments as well. 
The calculation framing often cues reasoning like “A = 
BC, but we don’t know C, but we can use C = EF to 
get C, then we can use C to get A”. The electric current 
example just above could be a nice example of chain-
ing while in a physical mapping framing if the student 
was simultaneously thinking about the formula  
ΔV = IR.  Chaining is usually absent or severely lim-
ited if the student is framing his math use solely as 
invoking authority. 
D. Framing 4:  Mathematical consistency 
Suppose you were trying to explain Coulomb’s Law 
for the electric force, , to a student.  
You might remind him of the expression for the gravi-
tational force, , and demonstrate how 
ideas from this more familiar bit of math map to Cou-
lomb’s Law. Both forces depend on the relative 
strengths (mass or charge) of the two objects in ques-
tion. Both forces fall off with respect to distance in the 
same way, and both include a proportionality constant 
(G or ) that must be experimentally measured. 
Even dis-analogous observations can be illuminating. 
Gravity is always attractive, hence the negative sign is 
explicitly included in front of the always positive 
masses. An electric force can be attractive or repul-
sive, so the implicit signs on the positive or negative 
charges, q1 and q2, will determine the direction of the 
Coulomb force. 
Implicit in your discussion with the student would be 
the class of warrants indicative of a Math Consistency 
framing: mathematics and mathematical manipula-
tions have a regularity and reliability and are consis-
tent across different situations.  Establishing a com-
mon underlying mathematical structure allows one to 
trust the relevant set of relations and inferences. 
E. Correlates of the four framing clusters 
Our four common framings are primarily identified via 
the warrants physics students use in their mathematical 
reasoning.  Other indicators, however, have been ob-
served to cluster preferentially around certain fram-
ings.  The table below summarizes these primary (i.e. 
warrants) and secondary framing indicators we have 
observed in our data set.
 
 Calculation Physical Mapping Invoking Author-
ity 
Math Consistency 
Class of Warrant 
Used 
Correctly follow-
ing algorithmic 
steps gives trust-
able result 
Goodness-of-fit 
between math and 
physical observa-
tions or expecta-
tions attests to a 
result. 
Authoritatively 
asserting a result 
or a rule gives it 
credence. 
Similarity or logi-
cal connection to 
another math idea 
offers validation. 
Other Common 
Indicators 
-focus on technical 
correctness 
-math chaining:  
need this to get 
that 
-often aided by a 
diagram 
-demonstrative 
gesturing 
-quoting a rule 
-absence of 
mechanistic chain-
ing 
-little acknowl-
edgment of sub-
structure  
-analogy with an-
other math idea 
-categorization 
Table 1:  Four common framings and their primary (i.e. warrants) and secondary indicators. 
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Framing is a dynamic cognitive process. A person’s 
mind makes an initial judgment regarding the nature of 
the situation at hand, but that judgment is continually 
updated and reevaluated.  New information comes to 
the student all the time, whether in the form of a 
classmate’s comment, an interviewer’s interjection, 
simply turning to a different page in a textbook, or 
even spontaneous random associations within her own 
brain. This new information can lead a student to 
reframe her activity. As a result, the epistemological 
framings observed in these students’ work can extend 
over a range of time periods. We have found examples 
in our data set ranging from ten seconds to ten minues. 
F. Inter-rater reliability  
of epistemological framing analysis 
The value of this study’s epistemological framing 
analysis depends in part on how readily other re-
searchers can apply it consistently.  An inter-rater reli-
ability study was carried out by giving this paper’s 
methodology discussion to another researcher and that 
researcher was then asked to parse a new transcript for 
epistemological framing.  Details of this inter-rater 
reliability test are given in Chapter Four of the first 
author’s dissertation.1b  Different researchers agreed 
on their framing codes 70% of the time for a novel 
transcript before any consultation or discussion. This 
figure improved to 80% after discussion. 
We do not expect our epistemological framing coding 
scheme to yield a 100% consistent coding of a random 
transcript. Students’ thinking is simply not that cleanly 
compartmentalized. Indeed, we argue (see ref. 1b, 
Chapter 7) that one characteristic of expertise in phys-
ics problem solving is the ability to effectively blend 
these four framings dynamically. 
Two issues are relevant here. First, there is the ques-
tion of how often students are observed to spend an 
appreciable time, say a minute or more, uniquely in 
one of this paper’s four common framings.  Of all the 
data analyzed for this study, perhaps less than 50% can 
be cleanly coded in minute-or-longer chunks under 
one of these general framings. 
The second notion of “clean coding” of framing that is 
relevant concerns not these minute-long pure state 
framings but rather our ability to identify smaller 
chunks in hybrid framings.  Calculation, physical 
mapping, invoking authority, and math consistency do 
a reasonable job of spanning the space of these stu-
dents’ mathematical arguments. We observed that 
about 90% of a random episode or more can be seen as 
made up of behavior indicative of those four landmark 
framings. But at this stage of student development 
(upper division physics majors) hybrids are common. 
Perhaps a student quotes a few computational rules as 
he performs a long calculation. Maybe a student makes 
an analogy to both a similar physical situation and a 
similar math structure. As the inter-rater reliability test 
shows, researchers can still use this study’s analysis 
scheme to identify evidence of these elemental fram-
ings in a piece of transcript that is, in general, a more 
complicated (and a more expert-like) hybrid framing. 
V. CASE STUDIES 
We now turn to our two case studies.  These detailed 
examples illustrate how this paper’s warrant-based 
framing analysis can be applied to parse an authentic 
conversation among physics students. 
The students’ framing of their math use plays a sig-
nificant role in each of these episodes.  The principal 
dynamic in each of these conversations concerns how 
to interpret the math at hand.  A significant amount of 
these students’ energy goes into trying to establish the 
epistemological framing they see as appropriate. 
In both studies, their thinking is dynamic.  Different 
bits of their mathematical knowledge are activated and 
deactivated as they frame and reframe their activity.  
Sometimes framing differences have marked effects.  
The students sometimes talk past each other, neither 
one seeming to hear what the other is saying, because 
they are framing their work differently.  Sometimes a 
student’s framing can exhibit considerable resistance 
to change, as in this section’s first case study.  The 
second case study shows students being more flexible 
in their framing. 
A. Case study 1:   
Framings can have inertia 
The first case study comes from a group of three stu-
dents enrolled in the class Intermediate Theoretical 
Methods (PHYS 374). One is a junior (S2) and the 
other two are sophomores (S1 and S3). These three 
students met regularly outside of class to work on their 
homework together, and this episode was taped during 
one such homework session. 
1.  The question 
Our episode starts in the middle of their work on one 
of that week’s homework problems. The problem they 
were considering reads: 
A rocket (mass m) is taken from a point A near an as-
teroid (mass M) to another point B. We will consider 
two (unrealistic) paths as shown in the figure. Calcu-
late the work done by the asteroid on the rocket along 
each path.  Use the full form of Newton’s Universal 
Law of Gravitation (not the flat earth approximation 
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“mg”). Calculate the work done by using the funda-
mental definition of work:   .                   
 
Figure 1:  Case Study 1 problem 
The reader familiar with the physics of this example 
will recognize an attempt to get the student to see how 
the theorem that says potential energy is path inde-
pendent arises out of explicit calculation.  Not all of 
the students in this discussion recognized the point of 
the problem from the beginning. 
2.  The first framing clash 
During this episode, the students are trying to decide if 
the work done should be the same along the two paths 
from A to B. They had previously suppressed the G, 
m, and M constants and written the (incorrect)49 equa-
tion  on the black-
board to express the work done along the direct and 
two-part paths, respectively. They have also copied the 
diagram of the situation from the problem statement. 
The students are standing at the blackboard where all 
the relevant equations and diagrams appear. We focus 
on the type of justification each student offers for his 
math arguments: 
1. S1: what’s the problem?  
2. You should get a different answer      
3. from here for this. [Points to each path 
on two-path diagram. ]  
4. S2: No no no  
5. S1: They should be equal?  
6. S2: They should be equal  
7. S1: Why should they be equal?  
8. This path is longer if you think about it. [Points to 
two-part path again]  
9. S2: Because force, err, because  
10. work is path independent.  
11. S1: This path is longer, so it should have, [Points 
to two-part path again]  
12. this number should be bigger than  
13. S2: Work is path independent. If you  
14. go from point A to point B,  
15. doesn’t matter how you get there,  
16. it should take the same amount of work. 
 
Lines 1 to 6 contain the main issue of this episode. 
While S1 thinks there should be different amounts of 
work done on the small mass along the two different 
paths, S2 believes the work done should be the same. 
S1 provides a justification for his claim in lines 7 and 
8 when he challenges S2’s same-work assertion. “This 
path is longer if you think about it.” The mathematical 
definition of work, , is essentially 
“force times distance”.  Since the two-part path from 
A to B is physically (geometrically) longer than the 
direct route, it seems to follow to S1 that more work 
must be done along the longer path. 
In the language of formal argumentation theory,35 S1 
makes the claim that more work is done along the two-
part path, and he offers the data that the two-part path 
is longer. An unspoken warrant exists that connects his 
data to his claim: the particular mathematics being 
used should align with the physical systems under 
study. The goodness-of-fit between the math at hand 
and the physical system attests to the validity of one’s 
conclusions. The work formula seems to say “force 
times distance” to S1.  The two-part path has more 
“distance”, and S1 thus draws justification for his an-
swer. 
S1’s warrant thus suggests he is framing his activity as 
physical mapping. His use of a diagram in lines 1 to 3 
and 7 to 8 supports this characterization. He gestures 
to the different paths as he points out that the two-part 
one is physically longer. Use of a diagram as interme-
diary between the physical situation and the mathemat-
ics is a commonly observed indicator of a physical 
mapping framing. 
S2 not only has a different answer than S1, but he is 
also framing his use of mathematics in a different way. 
S2 claims that the work done on the small mass should 
be the same along the two paths “because work is path 
independent” (lines 9 and 10). His data is a familiar 
mantra (though he omits mentioning how this state-
ment is only valid for conservative forces like gravity). 
The unspoken warrant that S2 is relying on concerns 
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the common use of rules and definitions in math and 
physics: sometimes previous results are simply taken 
as givens for speed and convenience. S2 is framing his 
math use as invoking authority. 
After hearing S2’s counterargument, S1 repeats him-
self. In lines 11 and 12, he restates his longer-path 
justification and again points to the relevant features of 
the diagram they had previously drawn on the board. 
S2 responds by restating “work is path independent” in 
line 13 and again, slightly differently, in lines 14 to 16. 
The most important observation in this first clip is that 
S1 and S2 are disagreeing over much more than 
merely the answer itself. Explicitly, they are debating 
whether or not more work is done along the longer 
path. Implicitly, they are arguing over the most useful 
way to frame their present use of mathematics. S1 
never explicitly says “Please respond to my claim in a 
way that maps our math to some detail of the physical 
situation I may have overlooked”. His phrasing and 
gesturing in his initial argument (lines 7 and 8) and 
beyond (lines 11 and 12) implies this framing request, 
though. 
When S2 responds with his rule citation, he is not 
merely arguing for a different answer. He is pushing 
for a different type of warrant for judging the validity 
of a given answer. S2’s invoking an authority framing 
may have even prevented him from really hearing 
what S1 was saying. S1’s framing request may have 
passed by S2 unnoticed because he was too caught up 
in the subset of all his math resources that his invoking 
authority framing had activated within his mind. At 
any rate, S2 responds in lines 9 and 10 with a different 
type of justification than what S1 was expecting. 
When S1 repeats himself in lines 11 and 12, he is im-
plicitly repeating his bid for a physical mapping fram-
ing. One can imagine a situation when S2’s invoking 
authority justification would simply be accepted with-
out incident, but here it did not align with S1’s present 
framing. S2 does not respond to this reframing request 
and repeats his answer as he remains in invoking 
authority. 
There is thus an intense framing argument going on 
under the surface of this debate. Sensing that he is not 
making any headway in the framing battle, S1 now 
moves to shift both himself and S2 into a third fram-
ing. 
3. A temporary agreement on a third framing 
S1 now makes a move toward a third way of address-
ing the mathematics at hand.  S2 accepts for a time. 
 
17. S1: OK, that’s assuming Pythagorean  
18. Theorem and everything else add[s].  
19. Well, OK, well is this— what was the  
20. answer to this right here? [Points to 
.]   
21. What was that answer?  
22. S2: Yeah, solve each integral numerically.  
23. S1: Yeah, what was that answer?  
24. S3: Each individual one?  
25. S1: Yeah, what was  
26. S3: OK, let me, uhh     [S3 starts typing into 
Mathematica]  
27. S1: Cause path two is longer than path one, so  
28. S2: May I, for a minute?  [S2 writes on a small 
corner of the blackboard,  but never speaks about 
what he writes.]  
29. S1: and path one was this.  
30. S2: Gimme this, I wanna think about something.  
31. S1: Just add those up, tell me the number for this  
[Points to integrals again]  
32. and I’ll compare it to the number of  
33. S3: OK, the y-one is point one five.  
34. S1: I, just give me the, just sum those up.  
35. I just want the whole total.  
36. I just want this total quantity there,  
37. just the total answer.  [Points to integrals again]  
38. S2: Oh, it was point four-  
39. S3: No, that’s the other one [direct path].  
40. S1: you gave it to me before, I just didn’t write it 
down.  
41. S3: Oh I see, point, what, point six one eight  
42. S1: See, point six one eight, which is what I said,  
43. the work done here should be larger  
44. than the work done here ‘cause the path    [Points 
to two-path diagram]  
45. S2: No, no no, no no no  
46. S3: the path where the x is changing  
47. S2: Work is path independent.  
48. S1: How is it path independent?  
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49. S2: by definition  
50. S3: Somebody apparently proved this before we 
did. 
 
S1 attempts to reframe the discussion in lines 19 to 21. 
He points to the integrals they’ve written and asks, 
“Well, OK…what was the answer to this right here? 
What was that answer?” He is calling for someone to 
evaluate each of their expressions for the work so that 
he can compare the numeric results. This argument 
relies on another kind of warrant. Mathematics pro-
vides one with a standardized, self-consistent set of 
manipulations and transformations. Performing a cal-
culation or having a computer do it for you according 
to these rules will give a valid, trustable result. S1 is 
moving to reframe their math use as calculation. 
Even though S1 doesn’t explicitly detail the new war-
rant he is proposing, S2 quickly zeroes in on it. He 
immediately responds, “yeah, solve each integral nu-
merically” (line 22). Compare this successful, fluid 
epistemic frame negotiation with the struggle of the 
previous snippet. Lines 1 to 16 had S1 pushing for 
physical mapping while S2 lobbied for invoking 
authority. Both stuck to their positions, resulting in an 
inefficient conversation. Neither was accepting what 
the other was trying to say. Lines 19 to 22 have S1 and 
S2 agreeing, for the moment, on what type of mathe-
matical justification should count. 
The calculation framing negotiated, lines 23 to 41 are 
mostly about S1 directing S3 to input the proper ex-
pressions into Mathematica, a common software calcu-
lator package. They finish with Mathematica in line 
41. It turns out that the radial path integral, , is 
equal to 0.47 while the two-part path integrals, 
, evaluate to 0.618. S2 was cor-
rect back in lines 1 to 16. The same amount of work 
should be done along the two paths. While the radial 
integral is correct as written (within a negative sign), 
they have neglected the cosine term from the dot prod-
uct  in the two-part path integrals. 
S1 takes the result of their calculation argument to 
support his earlier physical mapping framing. “See, 
point six one eight, which is what I said, the work 
done here should be larger than the work done here 
‘cause the path…” (lines 42 to 44). This move is quite 
impressive.  Here, S1 is using his calculation framing 
as a subroutine of sorts. He is nesting his computation 
within a larger scheme of supporting his physical 
mapping argument of longer-path-means-more-work. 
 
S1 gives another hint that the physical mapping fram-
ing has not completely decayed while they are calcu-
lating. In the midst of the Mathematica work, he tosses 
in “cause path two is longer than path one” (line 27). 
This example illustrates the “hybrid” point made in the 
interrater reliability section of this paper. Physics stu-
dents’ thinking is simply not always compartmental-
ized. The four framings only represent general clusters 
of reasoning. That S1 tosses in a still-active piece from 
his previous physical mapping into the calculation is 
neither an anomaly of thought nor a failure of this pa-
per’s framework. A likely mark of expertise in physics 
is a fluid movement among framings. Indeed, this 
problem was set up and assigned for the very purpose 
of encouraging students to look for coherency among 
various framings like S1 is doing here. 
Earlier, we claimed that less than 50% of a random 
episode of student thinking could be cleanly coded as 
an elemental form of calculation, physical mapping, 
invoking authority, or math consistency. Still, we 
claimed that about 90% of a transcript could be seen as 
a molecular combination of overlapping bits of them. 
Lines 19 to 41 are an example that is mostly calcula-
tion but is fuzzed somewhat by physical mapping. 
S2 responds in a familiar way to S1’s recall of physi-
cal mapping in lines 42 to 44: “See, point six one 
eight, which is what I said, the work done here should 
be larger than the work done here ‘cause the path”. S2 
returns to invoking authority to justify his equal-work 
assertion in lines 45 and 47. “No, no no, no no 
no…work is path independent”. When S1 presses him 
for more detail, “how is it path independent?” (line 
48), S2 and S3 respond “by definition” (line 49) and 
“somebody apparently proved this before we did” (line 
50). 
4. An even stronger bid for physical mapping 
The replies of S2 and S3 in lines 49 and 50 do not con-
tain the type of justification S1 seeks. The next block 
of transcript begins with S1 making another strong bid 
for physical mapping. 
 
51. S1: OK, I don’t understand the concept then,  
52. because you’re saying it’s path independent.  
53. S2: I’m saying, if you’re at the bottom of a hill  
54. S1: all right  
55. S2: and you want to drive to the top of the hill  
56. S1: right  
57. S2: and there’s a road that goes like this,  
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58. a road that goes like this, and a road that’s like this,      
[Draws   ] 
59. it takes the same amount of energy to get  
60. from the bottom to the top.  
61. It doesn’t matter which one you take.  
62. S1: OK, then you tell me this then;  
63. work is force times distance, right?  
64. S2: It’s the integral of f-dr…f-dr, yeah.  
65. S1: So if you’re going this r, and             
 [Draws  ] 
66. you’re going this R, which one has more work? 
67. S2: If there’s constant force?  
68. S1: Constant force on each on 
69. S2: This one if it’s the same force.   [Points to long 
“R” path] 
70. S1: OK, now the same force is acting on that  
71. S2: No. No no. Because this one [radial] has  
72. direct force the whole time.  
73. See, there’s lesser force. [Gestures at two-path 
diagram]  
74. S1: OK  
75. S2: in each one of these [two part path] 
76. S1: OK. All right  
77. S2: your forces are  
78. S1: I see what you mean.  I see what you mean. 
79. Here we’re taking  
80. S2: Here we’re supposed  
81. to be compensating for that 
82. S1: We’re just taking the x component   [Gestures 
at two-path diagram]  
83. of the force here, and the y component  
84. of the force there. You’re probably right. 
85. You’ve probably been right the whole time 
86. Are we thinking about that correctly then?  
87. I agree with what you’re saying. 
 
S1 begins this last transcript chunk with another bid to 
frame their math use as physical mapping.  “I don’t 
understand the concept then, because you’re saying 
it’s path independent” (lines 51 and 52). 
S2 responds to this newest bid with an interesting hy-
brid of his own.  He is still quoting “work is path inde-
pendent” but he now couches that rule in terms of a 
physical situation. He draws a picture of various paths 
up a hill and asserts “it takes the same amount of en-
ergy to get from the bottom to the top. It doesn’t mat-
ter which one you take” (lines 53 to 61). 
S2’s latest response still partly reflects an invoking 
authority framing because it offers no physical mecha-
nism for why the work done by gravity should be the 
same along any of the paths up the hill. Technically, 
your car would burn more gasoline along the curviest 
path, but S2 doesn’t acknowledge this point and may 
not have even considered it in light of the inertia in-
voking authority is exhibiting in his thought. Perhaps 
S2 has a more detailed physical mechanism in his 
mind, but he doesn’t articulate it here. 
Nonetheless, S1 recognizes a glimmer of the type of 
justification he seeks in S2’s latest argument. S1 
presses further on the longer-path issue. “OK, then you 
tell me this then; work is force times distance, right? 
… So if you’re going this r, and you’re going this R, 
which one has more work?” (lines 62 to 66) This ques-
tion is S1’s most explicit call yet for a physical map-
ping framing. He closely juxtaposes a mathematical 
point (work is force times distance) and a diagram-
aided observation of a longer path (his r and R pic-
ture).  
This reframing bid tips S2. His hint of a physical map-
ping framing in lines 57 to 61 asserts itself, putting 
him in a much better position to understand S1’s ar-
gument. For the first time in this conversation, S2 ex-
plicitly addresses a physical detail relevant to the 
physical mapping S1 is attempting: “if there’s constant 
force?” (line 67) S1 quickly affirms that assumption 
and S2 correctly concludes that more work would be 
done on the long “R” path. When S1 quickly moves 
from this hypothetical r and R case back to the home-
work problem (line 70), S2 immediately points out the 
inconsistency. “No. No no. Because this one [radial] 
has a direct force the whole time. See, there’s lesser 
force … in each one of these [two-part path]…here 
we’re supposed to be compensating for that” (lines 71 
to 75 and 80 to 81). S2 gestures to the problem’s dia-
gram during this physical mapping. The gravitational 
force vector and the displacement vector are (anti-) 
parallel for the radial path, hence you need to consider 
the full magnitude of the gravitational force in calcu-
lating the work done along that path. These two vec-
tors do not align perfectly along the two-part path, 
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hence you only consider a component of the force 
there. 
S1 quickly accepts and confirms this argument (lines 
78 to 87), which is the first fully articulated physical 
mapping argument S2 had offered during this conver-
sation. His quick comprehension and acceptance occur 
because S2 has now framed their problem solving in 
the way S1 has. S1 was mentally ready to accept such 
an argument. 
S2’s reluctance to adopt a physical mapping framing 
implies an activation failure, not lack of sophistication 
or naivety. His reluctance was certainly not due to 
simple inability. He was, after all, the one who actu-
ally wrote the integrals (which do not contain the nec-
essary cosine factors but, according to S2, were meant 
to reflect the “lesser force” idea) in the minutes lead-
ing up to the presented transcript. S2 quickly generated 
a physical mapping argument once he framed the dis-
cussion as physical mapping, i.e. once he activated the 
relevant subset of his mental resources. 
5.  Summary of the first case study 
This case study illustrates how epistemological fram-
ing negotiation and communication can be a powerful 
dynamic in physics students’ work.  S1 and S2 dis-
agreed over much more than whether the gravitational 
work done was independent of path.  Their disagree-
ment over what type of justification was appropriate 
drove this conversation.  Much of this debate was im-
plicit.  S1 never came out and said, for example, 
“please respond to me in a way that points out some 
detail of the physical situation that I have not mapped 
correctly to the mathematics we’re using.”  The epis-
temological framing analysis presented in this disserta-
tion offers a way of making this implicit conversation-
dynamic explicit to teachers and physics education 
researchers. 
In this case study these epistemological framings ex-
hibiting had considerable inertia.  S2 remained in in-
voking authority despite several prods.  S1’s commit-
ment to physical mapping allowed those prods to keep 
happening.  The next case study shows a student shift-
ing frames much more readily. 
B. Case study 2:  Framings can be flexible 
This next case study also has two physics students 
trying to agree on the best way to frame the math use 
at hand.  Like S1 in the last example, S4 will make 
several framing bids.  S5 responds to these bids more 
readily than S2 did, illustrating how epistemological 
framing can be a relatively labile process as well. 
 
1. The question 
The two students in this episode are enrolled in a sec-
ond semester undergraduate quantum mechanics class.  
Like the students in the previous episode, they are 
meeting outside of class to work on that week’s 
homework assignment.  The case study begins with the 
students part way through problem 6.32, part b, in 
Griffiths’s Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, a 
common undergraduate textbook.50  That problem 
deals with the Feynman-Hellmann theorem, 
, which relates the partial derivative 
of an energy eigenvalue with respect to any parameter 
λ to the expectation value of the same partial deriva-
tive of the Hamiltonian.  The problem tells them to 
consider the one-dimensional harmonic oscillator, for 
which the Hamiltonian is  and 
the nth eigenvalue is .  They are asked 
to set λ equal to ω, ħ, and m (the angular frequency of 
the oscillator, Planck’s constant, and the mass of the 
oscillator, respectively) and to use the Feynman-
Hellmann theorem to get expressions for the oscilla-
tor’s kinetic and potential energy expectation values. 
We begin with S4 noticing an oddity.  When she sets  
λ = ħ , the Feynman-Hellmann theorem requires her to 
consider .  How does one deal with a partial deriva-
tive with respect to a constant? 
2. A framing clash and a quick shift 
The two students are seated at a table throughout this 
discussion.  They do not gesture towards any diagrams 
or equations in a shared space. 
 
1. S4: If we figure this out, hopefully it’ll make  
2. the other ones easier.  When you say something’s  
3. a function of a certain parameter, doesn’t that mean  
4. that as you change that parameter, the function 
changes? 
5. S5: mmm-hmm 
6. S4: OK, so I can change omega, but I can’t change 
h-bar. 
7. S5: Sure you can.  
8. S4: I can? 
9. S5: You can make it whatever you want it to be.   
10. S4: But 
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11. S5: It’s a constant in real life, but it’s a funct-, it’s,  
12. it appears in the function and you’re welcome to 
change its value. 
13. S4: But then it doesn’t mean anything. 
14. S5: Sure it does.  Apparently it means  
15. the expectation value of [kinetic energy]. 
16. S4: You don’t really know what you’re talking 
about. 
17. S5: Look, all it is, is you’re gonna take the deriva-
tive with respect to 
18. S4: Yeah, I understand what they want me to do 
here. 
19. S5: They’re just applying the theorem. 
 
S4 begins this passage with a concise check on what a 
derivative entails.  “When you say something’s a func-
tion of a certain parameter, doesn’t that mean that as 
you change that parameter, the function changes?” 
(lines 2 to 4).  Upon S5’s affirmation, S4 points out a 
mismatch of this mathematical point with a physical 
reality.  The parameter ħ is a physical constant.  Tak-
ing a partial derivative with respect to ħ would imply 
that Planck’s constant can vary.  S4 is framing her use 
of mathematics as physical mapping.  Her warrant for 
not accepting the 
 
∂
∂
 operation focuses on how valid 
uses of math in physics class tend to align with physi-
cal reality. 
S5 initially responds to S4’s concern by asserting a 
rule.  The warrant for his counterargument concerns 
the practical, common use of statements and previous 
results without explicit justification.  “Sure you can 
[change ħ]” he says.  “You can make it whatever you 
want it to be” (lines 7 and 9).  In so responding, S5 is 
lobbying for an invoking authority framing.  He is 
suggesting S4 set aside her physically motivated ob-
jections and instead judge the validity of  according 
to his confidence in his assertions. 
Much like the two students in the gravitational work 
example, S4 and S5 are arguing over something much 
deeper than whether or not one is allowed to take a 
partial derivative with respect to ħ.  They are disagree-
ing over what would be appropriate grounds for ac-
cepting or rejecting such an operation. 
S4 does not accept S5’s bid for invoking authority.  
Upon her first protest in line 10, S5 quickly admits 
“it’s a constant in real life” (line 11) but sticks to his 
invoking authority framing.  “It appears in the function 
and you’re welcome to change its value” (lines 11 and 
12). 
S4 protests again; “But then it doesn’t mean anything” 
(line 13).  Such a statement’s full interpretation relies 
on acknowledging S4’s physical mapping framing.  In 
some framings, S4’s statement is patently false.  The 
operation  can “mean” plenty.  For example, for-
mally carrying out the operation on the Hamiltonian 
operator would produce the operator .  Devel-
oping both the calculus machinery and the abstract 
interpretation of such an operation was the crowning 
achievement of Newton and Leibniz’s mathematical 
studies.  S5 retains his invoking authority framing and 
quickly responds with another “meaning” of .  
Quoting from the textbook’s statement of the home-
work problem, “Sure it [means something].  Appar-
ently it means the expectation value of [kinetic en-
ergy]” (lines 14 and 15).  Recall the question had told 
them to set λ = ħ in the Feynman-Hellmann theorem, 
, and hence obtain an expression for 
the expectation value of kinetic energy.  S5 is thus 
relying on the authority of the text’s question for his 
interpretation of .  Only by acknowledging S4’s 
current physical mapping framing can we place her 
claim in the proper context.  If one’s warrant for judg-
ing an operation like  concerns the alignment of 
the mathematics with a physical reality, then yes, that 
operation can be said not to “mean” much of anything.  
In the real physical world Planck’s constant has a par-
ticular value and does not vary. 
S4 objects to S5’s arguments again in line 16.  “You 
don’t really know what you’re talking about.”  This 
perturbation was sufficiently strong to cause S5 to 
reframe his attempt to justify .  He says “look, all it 
is, is you’re gonna take the derivative with respect to” 
(line 17) before getting cut off by S4.  Coupled with 
his next statement in line 19, “they’re just applying the 
theorem,” these statements can be seen as an attempt 
to reframe his thinking as calculation.  S5 is suggest-
ing they go ahead and use their calculus machinery to 
take the partial derivative.  As long as they stay true to 
the rules of calculus, they should be able to trust what-
ever result appears. 
S4 acknowledges this attempt to reframe their work as 
calculation.  “Yeah, I understand what they want me to 
do here” (line 18).  Lines 17 to 19 nicely illustrate how 
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efficient this implicit epistemic frame negotiation can 
be.  These lines didn’t even take five seconds to speak.  
In those five seconds, S5 made a call for using a dif-
ferent set of warrants.  S4 heard that call and her brain 
quickly activated some of the procedures and tech-
niques that would be associated with such a framing, 
as evidenced by “yeah, I understand what they want 
me to do here” (line 18).  S5, just as quickly, acknowl-
edges S4’s acknowledgment of his reframing sugges-
tion with his “they’re just applying the theorem” (line 
19). 
3. Another quick shift, this time  
to a shared physical mapping framing 
S4 still insists on a justification more in line with her 
physical mapping framing.  She begins the next chunk 
of transcript with another reframing objection.  S5 
responds by nimbly dropping his calculation framing 
and adopting physical mapping himself. 
 
20. S4: But I don’t understand how you can take the 
derivative 
21. with respect to a constant.  
22. S5: Because if you change the constant then the 
function will change. 
23. S4: But then it’s not, it’s not physics. 
24. S5: So?  Actually it is, ‘cause, you know,  
25. a lot of constants aren’t completely determined. 
26. S4: There’s still only one value for it, that’s what a 
constant is. 
27. S5: The Hubble constant changes.  The Hubble 
constant changes  
28. as we improve our understanding of the rate of 
expansion of the universe,  
29. and we use the Hubble constant in equations.  
30. S4: But there’s only one, right, there’s only one 
constant.  It does not vary. 
31. S5: Yeah, but the value’s changing as we approach 
the correct answer. 
32. S4: It’s just gonna get fixed.  That’s not, that’s not 
helping us with the derivative. 
33. S5: You can always take a derivative with respect 
to anything. 
34. S4: But if you take it with respect to a constant, 
you’ll get zero. 
35. S5: Not if the constant itself appears in it.   
36. The derivative tells you if you change whatever  
37. you’re taking the derivative with respect to how 
will the function change? 
 
S4 begins this block of transcript by repeating her dis-
comfort with  (lines 20 and 21).  S5 responds with 
“because if you change the constant then the function 
will change” (line 22).  This statement does not clearly 
align with only one of this paper’s common framings.  
Its ambiguity comes in large part from its isolation.  
Perhaps it was a prelude to a calculation explanation, 
or perhaps S5 was preparing to use some sort of Math 
Consistency warrant as he related this  issue to a 
more familiar Calculus 101 example.  S5’s thought 
could have evolved this way or that, but one cannot 
assume line 22, by itself, was necessarily the tip of an 
implicit iceberg of coherence. 
S4’s next objection, “but then it’s not, it’s not phys-
ics,” (line 23) leads S5 to start explicitly searching for 
an example of a physical constant that varies.  In un-
dertaking such a search, S5 has adopted the framing 
S4 has been pushing.  Valid use of math in physics 
class should align with physical reality.  S5 hopes that 
by finding an example of a varying physical constant 
he can convince S4 that it is permissible to take a de-
rivative with respect to Planck’s constant.  S5 frames 
his activity as physical mapping starting in line 24. 
S5 invokes the analogy of the Hubble constant in lines 
24 to 31.  The Hubble constant is connected to the rate 
of expansion of the universe.  S5 points out that the 
value of the Hubble constant quoted by scientists has 
changed over the past half a century as our measure-
ment techniques have improved.  He argues that the 
Hubble constant, variable as it seems, is an important 
part of many physics equations.  By extension, it 
should be permissible to consider a varying Planck’s 
constant. 
S4 offers a much richer response to S5’s Hubble con-
stant argument than she has to any of his other at-
tempts in this episode.  Up to this point, she had been 
simply shooting down S5 with comments like “but 
then it doesn’t mean anything” (line 13), “you don’t 
really know what you’re talking about” (line 16), and 
“but then it’s not, it’s not physics” (line 23).  S5’s 
Hubble constant argument marked the first time he 
adopted S4’s warrant concerning the alignment of 
math and physics, i.e. the first time he and S4 shared a 
common epistemological framing. 
This shared epistemological framing helps S4 engage 
with S5’s chosen example in lines 26 to 32, and she 
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points out that he’s confusing a measurement variance 
with an actual physical variance.  Sure, she says, our 
quoted value for the Hubble constant has shifted as our 
measurements improve, but, presumably, our meas-
urements are tending towards a fixed value.  The Hub-
ble constant itself, she says, isn’t changing.  “That’s 
not helping us with the derivative” (line 32). 
This counterargument causes S5 to reframe the situa-
tion once again as he turns to a different type of justi-
fication.  He quotes a rule again in line 33.  “You can 
always take a derivative with respect to anything.”  S4 
misspeaks when she replies.  “But if you take it with 
respect to a constant, you’ll get zero” (line 34).  This 
statement seems to confuse her earlier correct interpre-
tation of  (as in lines 2 to 6) with the Calculus 101 
mantra “the derivative of a constant is zero”, i.e. 
.  S4 responds to this misstatement in lines 35 to 
37. 
4. A final frame shift 
The final block of transcript from this episode follows 
S5’s quick correction.  It begins with S4 objecting yet 
again and S5 trying out yet another framing. 
 
38. S4: So I don’t understand how you can change a 
constant. 
39. S5: You pretend like it’s not a constant.   
40. It’s just like when you take partial derivatives with 
respect to,  
41. like variables in a function of multivariables.   
42. You pretend that the variables are constant. 
43. S4: Yeah, I don’t have a problem with that. 
44. S5: You’re going the other way now.   
45. You’re pretending a constant is a variable.  Who 
cares? 
46. S4: It doesn’t make sense to me. 
47. S5: You can easily change a variable—it’s not 
supposed to, I don’t think.   
48. S4: OK, then I believe- 
49. S5: I don’t think, I don’t think there’s supposed to 
be  
50. any great meaning behind why we get the change 
h-bar.   
51. I think it just-they’re like oh look, if you do it  
52. and you take its derivative and you use this equa-
tion, 
53. then all of a sudden you get some expectation of 
[kinetic energy],  
54. and you say whooptie-freekin-do. 
 
S5 responds to S4’s latest objection in line 38 via a 
math consistency framing.  His newest argument relies 
on a warrant he hasn’t yet tried:  mathematics is a self-
consistent field of knowledge, so a valid mathematical 
argument is one that fits in logically with other 
mathematical ideas. 
S5 makes a common move for a math consistency 
framing.  He draws an analogy in lines 39 to 45.  In 
order to take a derivative with respect to ħ, one has to 
“pretend” that the constant is a variable.  S5 points out 
that taking a standard partial derivative with respect to 
one of the variables of a multivariable function in-
volves “pretending” the other variables are constants.  
Their  case, he argues, is “just like” that analogous 
example, except “you’re going the other way now.  
You’re pretending a constant is a variable.” 
In contrast to her more extended counterargument in 
the Hubble constant case, S4 rejects this present argu-
ment much more coarsely.  “It doesn’t make sense to 
me” (line 46).  S5 has once again framed their work 
differently than S4’s physical mapping.  A plausible 
explanation is that each student’s mind has activated a 
sufficiently different subset of their available mathe-
matical resources, and that restricts the depth of their 
communication and interaction. 
When S5 responds “it’s not supposed to [make sense], 
I don’t think” in line 47, he is explicitly addressing 
S4’s physical mapping framing for the first time.  
While he had been responsive to her objections 
throughout this episode, he now argues with her epis-
temological framing directly.  He states that he doesn’t 
think an explanation of the type S4 seeks exists.  S4 is 
possibly about to acknowledge inappropriateness of 
the physical mapping stance when she replies “OK, 
then I believe-” (line 48), but she gets cut off.  S5 then 
elaborates a hybrid of calculation and invoking author-
ity that he sees as most appropriate in lines 49 to 54.  
Mechanically take the derivative with respect to ħ, 
following the familiar calculation algorithms, and then 
trust the Feynman-Hellmann theorem to relate this 
derivative to the oscillator’s kinetic energy. 
5. Summary of the second case study 
This case study illustrates how epistemological fram-
ing can be a relatively flexible process.  The entire 
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episode is essentially many iterations of S4 objecting 
and S5 saying, “Well, all right, how about this other 
type of explanation?”  S4’s objections serve as pertur-
bations to S5’s mental state.  Many of them are of suf-
ficient strength (or occur after he has reached a re-
spectable closure point of his previous argument) to 
lead him to reframe his thinking.  Each reframing re-
sults in S5 adopting a different type of warrant for 
judging the validity of his mathematical claim, that 
one should accept the operation  as legitimate 
within physics, despite the constancy of ħ. 
This  issue is a relatively difficult one.  Ordinarily, 
a physical mapping frame is quite valuable in physics.  
Helping students understand the physical referents or 
their math is a common, if sometimes difficult, goal of 
many physics classes.  Here, S4 and S5 are being 
asked to do something even more subtle and difficult:  
consider an imaginary world, one where ħ can vary, 
and see if the mathematics in this imaginary world can 
inform the real one.  That S4 and S5 were willing to 
engage in an exploration of how to frame this  is-
sue is commendable, even if the episode ends without 
an especially satisfying consensus. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND  
IMPLICATIONS 
A. Summary 
In this paper we have argued that analyzing student 
problem solving from the point of view of the kind of 
warrants (or epistemological resources) they choose to 
use gives insight into the way the student is framing 
the mathematical task at hand.  From a large number 
of ethnographic observations of students in upper divi-
sion physics classes we selected situations in which 
students were taking contrasting views on the ap-
proach to be used.  From this salient data we created a 
classification of warrants that we believe indicate the 
students’ epistemological framing of the task. 
The two case studies both align and contrast with each 
other.  Both demonstrate how epistemological framing 
dynamics can drive a conversation.  The first illus-
trates that these framings can have significant inertia 
(as with S2), while the second shows that they can be 
relatively flexible (as with S5).  Both demonstrate that 
using a warrant analysis gives us additional insight 
into the students’ reasoning, concerns, and possible 
errors. 
The students in each case study disagree over much 
more than an answer.  They each frame their activity 
differently and hence try to apply a different type of 
warrant to judge the validity of their claims.  The stu-
dents exert various pushes and pulls on each other as 
they try to negotiate a common epistemological fram-
ing.  Vary rarely are these reframing bids explicit.  
Nonetheless, these framing debates underlie the speech 
in both of our case studies.  When a common framing 
is established, the conversation tends to be richer and 
more efficient.  The warrant analysis presented here is 
meant as a useful tool for finding explicit evidence of 
what is usually an implicit cognitive process. 
B. Implications for instruction 
Our analysis has important implications for teachers as 
well as for researchers.  First, being aware of framing 
can help an instructor be aware of when he and his 
students are not communicating – when they are “not 
on the same page.”  Second, being aware of framing 
can lead an instructor to understand the value of hybrid 
and flexible framing and lead to her evaluating student 
progress in a fashion that is both subtler and more pro-
ductive.  We elaborate briefly on each of these points 
and speculate on how an instructor might respond to 
these issues effectively. 
1. Being aware of framing  
can reveal failures in communication 
Framing differences like those in the case studies here, 
and the miscommunications that accompany them, 
could certainly occur between instructor and student as 
well as between students.  Both the instructor and stu-
dents will naturally frame what occurs during a lesson, 
but there is no guarantee they will frame each part of 
the lesson in the same way.  A teacher may calculate 
for a while and then want to make a point about how 
an equation matches a physical expectation.  The 
teacher may even offer a signal that she’s switching 
approaches, but perhaps that signal isn’t sufficient to 
tip the students.  They may merely try to interpret her 
physical mapping comments through a calculation 
lens, or even reject the physical mapping reframing as 
irrelevant and stop paying attention.  Perhaps a profes-
sor gives an extended math consistency discussion, 
carefully explaining how the math at hand is analo-
gous to a more familiar math idea.  Maybe her students 
are framing his discussion as invoking authority and 
instead hear a series of math facts to be accepted on 
faith. 
We conjecture that there are (at least) two ways to 
combat such teacher/student framing misunderstand-
ings.  The first is for a teacher to simply exaggerate 
her framing cues.  If the situation calls for conven-
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iently quoting a rule, spend a little extra time explain-
ing your reasons for doing so.  If it’s obvious to you, 
as a teacher, that a physical mapping discussion is in 
order, make that (and your reasons for believing so) 
more explicit to your class.  More explicit framing 
cues might lessen the probability of miscommunica-
tion due to a framing mismatch. 
A second antidote to teacher/student framing mis-
matches is for the teacher to gather more evidence, in 
real time, of her students’ framing.  In a traditional 
lecture, information tends to only flow from the pro-
fessor to the students.  Such a lecturer will have scant 
evidence available for how her students are framing 
her lesson.  Asking questions that have simple phrase-
like answers may give a teacher evidence of the simple 
correctness or incorrectness of the class’s answers, but 
is only of marginal help for deducing the students’ 
epistemological framing.  Engaging one’s students in 
extended discussions during class is the best way to 
get valuable framing evidence.  Asking open-ended 
questions that give students a wide range of possible 
responses will require them to explain their reasoning 
to a much greater depth.  As they explain their justifi-
cations for their claims, their framing will become 
much more apparent to the teacher.  Framing mis-
matches will become much easier to diagnose in real 
time. 
2. Being aware of framing can help an instructor  
better evaluate the progress of a student 
We conjecture that expertise in physics problem solv-
ing involves the ability to blend different epistemo-
logical framings and to flip quickly from one framing 
to another in response to snags and difficulties.  The 
clustering of skills into frames can be an efficient way 
to proceed; if one can quickly recognize the tools 
needed to solve a problem, the problem can be solved 
without spending time hunting through a large number 
of possibilities.  But when problems or inconsistencies 
arise, it can be more effective to explore a wider 
search space of possibilities. 
If an instructor is aware of the fact that students may 
“get stuck” in a framing that limits their access to tools 
and knowledge they may not only possess but be good 
at, the instructor will have a better understanding of 
the true nature of the difficulty the students may be 
experiencing.  That instructor will be less likely to 
“write off” his students as incompetent and more 
likely to try prodding them into a different framing.  
Developing homework questions comes to be seen as 
creating tasks of sufficient richness and complexity to 
help students develop these frame-juggling skills on 
their own.  This issue is discussed in more detail in 
reference 1b, Chapter 7. 
C. Implications for future research 
This analysis opens possibilities for significant re-
search efforts by illuminating a dimension of student 
performance that is rarely considered as a component 
of “student difficulties” but that potentially plays a 
critical and controlling role for many students.  Much 
more work is needed, both in improving the methodol-
ogy of identifying student framing and in explicating 
the role framing difficulties play in the typical class-
room. 
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